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Abstract
The world runs on networks over which signals communicate sequences of sym-
bols, e.g. numerals. Examining both engineered and natural communications net-
works reveals an unsuspected order that depends on contact with an unpredictable
entity. This order has three roots. The first is a proof within quantum theory that
no evidence can ever determine its explanation, so that an agent choosing an ex-
planation must do so unpredictably. The second root is the showing that clocks
that step computers do not “tell time” but serve as self-adjusting symbol-handling
agents that regulate “logically synchronized” motion in response to unpredictable
disturbances. Such a clock-agent has a certain independence as well as the ca-
pacity to communicate via unpredictable symbols with other clock-agents and to
adjust its own tick rate in response to that communication. The third root is the
noticing of unpredictable symbol exchange in natural systems, including the trans-
mission of symbols found in molecular biology. We introduce a symbol-handling
agent as a role played in some cases by a person, for example a physicist who
chooses an explanation of given experimental outcomes, and in other cases by
some other biological entity, and in still other cases by an inanimate device, such
as a computer-based detector used in physical measurements. While we forbear
to try to explain the propensity of agents at all levels from cells to civilizations to
form and operate networks of logically synchronized symbol-handling agents, we
point to this propensity as an overlooked cosmic order, an order structured by the
unpredictability ensuing from the proof. Appreciating the cosmic order leads to
a conception of agency that replaces volition by unpredictability and reconceives
the notion of objectivity in a way that makes a place for agency in the world as
described by physics. Some specific implications for physics are outlined.
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1. Introduction
Physicists find numerically expressed regularities in a world that every day
surprises us all with its irregularities. Recently, commenting on Canales’ book
about Bergson and Einstein [1], Crease pointed to an “experiential amnesia” in
physics [2], an amnesia that blocks attention to pre-conditions for physical time:
“Bergson was trying to bring to light a sense of time presupposed in the construc-
tion of physical time itself—indeed, in Einsteins own effort to give to such time a
definitive, mathematical formula.” The thesis of the present report is that “time”
as it works in physics is built out of networks of agent-clocks that do not dumbly
tick, but that self-adjust in response to unpredictable communications from other
clocks of the network. Examining both engineered and natural networks of clocks
reveals an unsuspected order that depends on contact with an unpredictable entity.
Attention to this unsuspected order has several implications, including an impact
on the notion of scientific objectivity.
Our exposition of this “cosmic order” has three roots. The first root is the
sharpening of a distinction obscured in today’s theoretical physics, namely the
distinction between obtaining numerically expressed evidence from experiments
on the laboratory bench and explaining that evidence in mathematical symbols
on the blackboard. As reviewed in Sec. 2, the sharpening of the distinction be-
tween physical numerical evidence and numbers calculated from a theory rests on
a proof within the mathematics of quantum theory that no amount of evidence,
represented in quantum theory in terms of probabilities, can uniquely determine
its explanation in terms of wave functions and linear operators. Beyond mere
opinion, the proof enables a clarity of thought otherwise unattainable in the dis-
tinction between measured and calculated numbers. The proof underpins all the
work presented here. Building on the proof we show a heretofore overlooked
unpredictability of explanations, an unpredictability beyond quantum uncertainty.
The choice of an explanation requires an unpredictable reach beyond logic, a fact
that challenges the traditionally notion of objectivity and that precludes any “final
answers.”
The second root stems from our experience with the design of clocking for
fault-tolerant computer networks. A computer operates one step after another,
regulated by the ticks of its clock. Fault tolerance is achieved by using a cluster
of several computers, all designed to do the same task; each computer makes its
computational moves in step with the others, and the computers compare notes at
each step. Their clocks are organized in a network in which each clock regulates
its tick rate to stay close enough to the other functioning clocks for comparisons to
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make sense, but loosely enough so that if one clock fails, the other clocks continue.
This requires self-adjusting clocks used not primarily to “tell time” but as agents
that regulate motion. Such a clock-agent has a certain independence as well as the
capacity to communicate with other clock-agents and to adjust its own tick rate in
response to that communication.
Clocks-as-agents are required also by the national and international organiza-
tions that generate time broadcasts. As spelled out in [3], no two clocks, even
those that “define” the international second as a unit of time, tick quite alike. For
this reason, and because any single clock can fail, the time broadcasts generated
by the National Institutes of Science and Technology (NIST) depend on several
clocks linked by communicated symbols, each clock adjusting its tick rate so as to
receive those symbols at a suitable phase. The self-adjustment of clocks requires
both computation and response to unpredictable events, two capacities that might
be called “cognitive”. In this way our notion of clock-as-agent has come to differ
rather dramatically from the popular image of “a clock.” In Sec. 3 we discuss
networks of symbol-handling agents equipped with such clocks, linked pairwise
by communicated symbols, with each agent’s clock adjusting its tick rate so as to
receive those symbols at a suitable phase.
The third root is a direction for future research set by noticing unpredictable
symbol exchange in natural systems, including the transmission of symbols found
in molecular biology.
We think of a symbol-handling agent as a role played in some cases by a per-
son, for example a physicist who chooses an explanation of given experimental
outcomes or a person in a bucket brigade, and in other cases by some other bio-
logical entity, and in still other cases by an inanimate device, such as a computer-
based detector used in physical measurements. We think of a symbol-handling
agent as exhibiting three capabilities:
1. an agent can transmit and receive symbol-carrying signals to and from other
agents;
2. an agent can transmit symbols that cannot be predicted prior to their trans-
mission;
3. circumstances permitting, an agent maintains a form of synchronization—
to be called logical synchronization—with one or more other agents, which
requires that an agent manage the tick rate of its clock.
We will speak of anything that exhibits these three capabilities as a symbol-handling
agent, or sometimes, for short, just as an agent. (In earlier work we spoke of
symbol-handling agents as live clocks[4] or open machines[5])
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As a descriptive form, a network of symbol-handling agents is broad enough
to encompass the computer network that mediates communications among physi-
cists, e.g. the internet with its traffic in both experimental and theoretical matters,
and also as a form that can be applied to describe naturally arising symbolic com-
munication, for example as in the molecular signals of biology. Below we discuss
the communication of symbols among agents as a neglected topic of physics.
To model some of the physical behavior of symbol-handling agents linked in
communications networks, we widen an approach pioneered by Turing. Turing
introduced the Turing machine to model a facet of human cognitive capacity. In
school we all learn to do sums, to multiply and divide, in short, to compute—a
word that in 1936 meant a capability primarily thought of as a human capability.
In that year Turing abstracted that particular cognitive capability to produce a
specification for an inanimate physical machine. The Church-Turing thesis states
that a function on the natural numbers is computable by a human being following
an algorithm, ignoring resource limitations, if and only if it is computable by a
Turing machine [6]. Since ‘what is computable by a human being’ is an informal
notion, it has no formal definition, so the thesis, although it has near-universal
acceptance, cannot be formally proven.
In essence, the agent role that we model is that of a physical sequential pro-
cessor, that is, a processor that takes one step after another, with the “next step”
influenced not just by a stored program but also by momentary contact with an
unpredictable entity. (Positing that an agent works sequentially answers the ques-
tion: what is the difference between one agent and two agents? Two agents can do
two things concurrently, but one agent can’t.) Our “agent as a physical sequential
processor” consists of a self-adjusting clock that regulates the motion of a Turing
machine which is modified to allow its contact with an unpredictable entity. For
this we use not the usual Turing machine but Turing’s Choice Machine (which
we capitalize for emphasis). The Choice Machine has the feature, crucial to our
model of an agent, that it can receive symbols from an unpredictable “outside”.
Note that the Choice Machine, unlike most modern practice in computer science,
enforces no separation between program and “data”, so that symbols received
from the unpredictable “outside” can work as programs.
Our model of an agent opens a crack in the traditional physicalist image of
clockwork as an explanatory principle in two ways:
1. By invoking Turing’s Choice Machine, we put the ‘physical sequential pro-
cessor’ in contact with an unpredictable entity; and
2. We reformulate the concept of a clock to account for how clocks actu-
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ally work in modern technical contexts, involving communication between
clocks and their rate adjustments in response to unpredictable measured
phases.
Years before developing the proof that separates evidence from its explana-
tions, we experimented on the laboratory bench with conditions under which the
interleaving of two sequences of symbols fails. As described in Sec. 4, these ex-
periments on instabilities in a decision-making device (a flip-flop) clarified the
circumstances under which two agents could be expected to agree about the sym-
bol presented to them at a shared moment. The experimental results on agreement
and disagreement contribute to a re-definition of the notion of “objectivity.” In
addition they open an avenue of what might be called “the physics of borderline
cases.”
Section 5 discusses symbol-handling agents in physics as they appear in sev-
eral contexts:
1. The experimental and theoretical working of physicists is mirrored in the
memories—think Turing tapes—of the computerized agents that mediate
their communications, e.g. over the internet.
2. Networks of symbol-handling agents, many of them automated, serve as
tools for experimental inquiry, especially in cases where extreme precision
is needed, as in the Laser Interferometer Gravitational Observatory (LIGO).
3. Networks of symbol-handling agents are promising as metaphors by which
to describe physical activity, for example in biophysics.
It will be shown that the need for logical synchronization impacts all these con-
texts; in particular, in situations requiring the highest attainable precision of mo-
tion, networks of symbol-handling agents cannot derive their timing as users of
national time broadcasts; they have to build their own “time.”
To reach our conclusions we make the following three assumptions:
1. We assume we can extend the proposition proven in quantum theory con-
cerning the unpredictability of explanations of given evidence to physics in
general.
2. We partition the (limited) cognitive capabilities of agent that we need to be
concerned with into computation on one side and contact with an unpre-
dictable entity on the other.
3. We assume the Church-Turing thesis.
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4. We assume that the communication of sequences of symbols among agents,
including people, is physical, not in the physics of a clockwork automa-
ton, but rather in the physics that we are trying to explicate, a physics that
has room in it for irreducible unpredictability beyond quantum uncertainty.
In particular, we assume that one agent, say Agent A, in contact with an
unpredictable device such as a photo-detector, can obtain from that device
a number that a second Agent B, human or not, can find out only by the
transmission of the number from agent A to B by a signal carrying numeric
symbols that express the number.
Remarks:
1. We note that the third and fourth assumptions may not be to everyone’s
taste; for alternative, non-reductive views, see [7, Sec. 5.3].
2. We do not offer a theory of cognition; rather we leave most of the many ca-
pabilities that lurk under the umbrella term cognition undiscussed; we deal
only with two: the capability to compute, whether by hand or by machine,
and the capability to guess an explanation, which, as outlined in Sec. 2, re-
quires an unpredictable act of a person in contact with an unpredictable
entity, provably necessary to physics. We focus on these two cognitive
capabilities to get at the role of unpredictability heretofore overlooked in
physics. Nor do we by any means offer a complete characterization of
“agency”, but rather a beachhead into a restricted class of symbol-handling
agents as descriptive elements that have been demonstrated to have inter-
esting applications. In particular we avoid attaching to agency any notion
of volition; we escape the need to do so by putting in its place an agent’s
responsiveness to something unpredictable.
3. We put a big emphasis on an agent’s capacity to issue unpredictable numeric
symbols, and one may ask “to what do we ascribe the issuance by an agent
of numeric expressions that are unpredictable?” This is essentially a ques-
tion of philosophy or religion, any answer to which must venture beyond
science. We like to think of the agent issuing such an expression as being in
contact with an unknowable entity, to which, within the bounds of science,
we are precluded from ascribing any additional features.
While we forbear to try to explain the abundance of behavior at all levels from
cells to civilizations aptly describable as consisting of logically-synchronized net-
works of symbol-handling agents in contact with something unpredictable, in the
discussion in Sec. 6 we will point to this abundance as an overlooked cosmic
order.
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2. Unpredictability stemming from logically undefined choices in explaining
given evidence
We begin this section with a reminder that several varieties of unpredictability
are endemic to physics. One familiar kind of unpredictability is the uncertainty
that pertains to a spread in a probability measure over a given set of possible out-
comes, implied by quantum theory for a generic measurement. Uncertainty makes
the outcome at any particular occurrence of a measurement unpredictable, and in
situations that require prompt action, discussed in Sec. 5, this unpredictability
matters. Another kind of unpredictability is implied by Go¨del’s 1931 proof of the
existence of undecidable propositions in arithmetic, and still another kind by Tur-
ing’s 1936 proof of the existence of uncomputable functions. Until fairly recently
one might suppose that uncomputable functions were to be found only in areas
of number theory remote from physics, but now examples are known of unde-
cidable functions within quantum theory. Furthermore, as we shall see, Turing’s
characterization of computation advanced not just mathematics, but also physics.
In connection with Turing computability, we note the distinction between
defining a function and computing its values. For example, the definition of the
square root 2 is distinct from the act of calculating some number of places of the
square root of 2 as a decimal expression. The distinction between defining and
computing allows one to speak of certain choices as not merely uncomputable but
as logically undefinable. Our prime example is the choice of an explanation of
given evidence, as expressed within quantum theory. We now review how this
choice of an explanation provably requires a reach beyond logic.
Quantum theory serves as a mathematical language by which to think about
experiments. Quantum language is built on a skeleton of a Hilbert space of states
and the Born trace rule. This skeleton imparts a mathematical form to quantum
language that remains stable while hypotheses with physical content come and go.
From this skeleton alone, we proved in [8] that explanations cannot be determined
uniquely from evidence.
The proof can be stated in simplified form, as follows. To recall the Born
trace rule, we express quantum states as density operators, and we express mea-
surements by positive operator-valued measures (POVMs). The simplest POVMs,
which are all that we need for a simplified statement of the proof, assume a finite
or a countably infinite set of outcomes and associate a positive operator Mi to the
i-th outcome. We call these Mi measurement operators. (They sum to the identity
operator:
∑
i
Mi = 1.) In explaining an experiment in quantum language, one
views the experiment as consisting of a number of trials, each of which involves
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a preparation followed by a measurement. One represents the preparation by a
density operator that can vary from trial to trial. One expresses the measurement
by a POVM that can also vary from trial to trial. Given a density operator ρ and a
measurement operator Mi, the probability of outcome i is given by the Born trace
rule as
tr(ρMi) = Pr(outcome i) (1)
The Born trace rule expressed in (1) relates probabilities on the right side of the
equation to a density operator and a measurement operator on the left side of the
equation. An experiment generates outcomes that can be tallied to approximate
probabilities, and the probability on the right side represents theoretically, on the
blackboard, so to speak, the most one can hope for in the way of numerical evi-
dence from an experiment. On the left side of the equation, the density operator
and the measurement operator express an explanation of the evidence. Going
from left to right in Eq. (1), given a density operator and a measurement opera-
tor, the Born trace rule tells how to calculate a unique probability; many textbook
problems ask for just such calculations. But there are no operators to be seen on
the bench, so what happens when an experiment shows something unpredicted
and a new explanation is needed? This question presents the inverse problem:
given the experimental outcomes interpreted as probabilities on the right side of
the equation, one seeks a combination of a density operator and a set of mea-
surement operators that generates the given probabilities. While the language of
quantum theory makes available density operators and measurement operators as
terms to write on the blackboard, it cannot tell you which density operators and
measurement operators to write in order to explain any particular experiment: for
this inverse problem there is no unique solution. Given any probability measure
on a countable set of outcomes, we proved that there are infinitely many POVMs
and density operators that generate the given probability measure. Thus whatever
experimental evidence is on hand admits of numberless explanations. Choosing
one or indeed any finite number of these explanations requires a reach beyond
logic; one has to guess [8]. And a physicist’s guessed explanation is logically
unpredictable.
Any experiment can be extended, e.g. by the insertion of another light source,
another detector, another filter, etc. Correspondingly, any explanation can be
viewed as a restriction to a special case of an explanation of an extended ex-
periment [9]. The numberless explanations that generate a probability measure
over a given parameter domain disagree among themselves with respect to the
extensions from which they can be restricted. This disagreement implies that ex-
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planations are almost certain to require revision when tested over enough of their
extensions. The picture emerges of an open cycle of the making of guessed expla-
nations, testing their extensions, and revising the guesses; that is, guessing again.
Remarks
1. The conflicts among predictions of extended explanations are not limited to
small differences associated with issues of precision. In some cases, two
explanations that generate given probabilities have drastically different im-
plications. An example concerns quantum key distribution, for which two
explanations fit a given probability measure, but one explanation asserts
that the quantum key distribution is secure against undetected eavesdrop-
ping while the other explanation asserts that the key distribution is totally
insecure [10].
2. To make a hypothesis in physics is to reach beyond logic to assert that a
mathematical structure represents certain physical behavior. Because of its
inescapable dependence on guesswork, the hypothesis is subject to even-
tual falsification. It is worth noting that, unlike a hypothesis stated in the
language of quantum theory, the language itself is not falsifiable: given
any probability measure on a countable set of outcomes, there exist (many)
quantum explanations, so there can be no probabilities that lie outside the
reach of quantum language [10]. Being unfalsifiable, the language of quan-
tum theory offers relatively stable mathematics. The proof of the need for
guesswork to choose an explanation is not a hypothesis of physics, but a
proof within mathematics.
3. Coming up with an explanation necessarily involves an act of imagination
beyond anything calculable. An act of imagination requires intimate con-
tact with something unknowable. (If you know it, you don’t have to imagine
it.) The finding that explanations cannot be calculated from data but require
contact with something unknowable has the following implication that adds
to the necessity in physics for communication. An person’s act of imagina-
tion expressed in symbols remains unknowable to a second person unless
the symbols of the expression are communicated from the person to the
second person.
4. Recognizing guesswork and its vulnerability to occasions for revision as in-
dispensable to explanations precludes the possibility of assuring any final
answer or any “objective truth.” Yet, under circumstances to be discussed in
the next section, agents can communicate sequences of numerals expressing
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evidence and explanations, numerals about which they can be expected to
agree; remarkable too is that the actions needed to maintain the communica-
tions channels depend on idiosyncratic contact with something unknowable,
beyond collective agreement.
3. Networks symbol-handling agents
This section is dense with detail needed for the design of experiments aimed
at exploring the cosmic order. In it we give modeling language to express agents
that recognize symbols carried by signals. By symbols, we mean elements of
communication among agents, human or not, that can lead to action involving
energy supplied not by the symbols themselves nor by the agent that sends them
but by the receiving agent. How a receiving agent responds to a symbol depends
on the past history of the agent. Symbols can be conveyed from agent to agent
in various ways, for example by: (1) letters, words, and numerals, expressed as
written characters, and (2) electronic impulses carrying bits in a computer, and (3)
molecules involved in biological signaling. Symbols used by people convey ele-
ments of thought, often prompting actions and emotions. And symbols convey the
calculational traffic to be found both in man-made computers and in the biological
processes of living creatures.
Whether to say signal or symbol as we use these words is a matter of point of
view, and not a matter of distinguishing two distinct things. Consider a pawn on a
chess board. From the viewpoint of players, the pawn is a symbol. A player is in-
different to variations within certain bounds of its shape, its weight, and when and
how it is placed on a square of the chessboard, e.g. whether it is a little off center
doesn’t matter. For the craftsman who makes the pawn, however, its signal aspect
matters: its shape, its weight, the material of which it is made. The same holds
for the 0’s and 1’s in a computer. To a programmer they are symbols, while to an
electrical circuit designer the details of the physical signals that the programmer
views as symbols matter greatly. It is a fact, indeed to us an amazing fact, that
symbols embodied by signals with large tolerances can take part in mechanisms
that act with tight tolerances. This is what happens in computer-controlled ma-
chining: the signals that carry the 0s and 1s in the computer can vary within broad
limits without interfering with the mathematical exactitude of the calculations that
control the shapes that are machined.
Numeric symbols arrive one after another, and the sequence matters: “1011”
is a different message from “1110”. An agent must deal with symbols in a way
that respects the order in which they arrive, making it convenient to view an agent
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as a sequential processor. Turing broke new ground by expressing a sequential
processor mathematically by his “machines”, both what today is called a Turing
machine and a lesser known Choice Machine that plays the crucial role in our
model of an agent.
Offering mathematical structure to represent physical behavior is the business
of physics, and in his “machines,” Turing made an interpretive leap beyond the
reach of mathematics to create novel physics. In representing the physical activity
of computing, he did not limit himself the terms (e.g. “particles and fields”) ex-
pected in physics; rather, he introduced new terms (e.g ‘tape’, ’scanned square’,
‘moment’, ‘move’) peculiarly appropriate to describing the activity of a calcula-
tional agent. In retrospect, one also sees physics implicit in Go¨del’s 1931 proof
of undecidability, because proving a proposition is a physical activity: one has to
write into a recording medium, and in checking a claimed proof, one reads the
written record.
In the rest of this section we consider agents who communicate by means of
transmitted sequences of symbols from one agent to another. We aim to show the
critical role of the timing required. To this end we assume that each agent is a
sequential processor. As a model of an agent that communicates with others, we
start with a Turing machine as a model of a sequential processor, and then modify
it, first by giving the machine the capacity to transmit and to receive symbols
from other such machines, and secondly by modifying the Turing machine to be
stepped by an accompanying clock that can have its rate adjusted by commands
from the Turing machine.
The Turing machine as a sequential processor is elegantly described in Tur-
ing’s 1936 paper:
We may compare a man in the process of computing a real number
to a machine which is only capable of a finite number of conditions
q1, q2, . . . , qR which will be called “m-configurations”. The machine
is supplied with a “tape” (the analogue of paper) running through it,
and divided into sections (called “squares”) each capable of bearing
a “symbol”. At any moment there is just one square, say the r-th,
bearing the symbol S(r) which is “in the machine”. We may call this
square the “scanned square”. The symbol on the scanned square may
be called the “scanned symbol”. The “scanned symbol” is the only
one of which the machine is, so to speak, “directly aware”. However,
by altering its m-configuration the machine can effectively remember
some of the symbols which it has “seen” (scanned) previously. The
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possible behaviour of the machine at any moment is determined by
the m-configuration qn and the scanned symbol S(r). This pair qn,
S(r) will be called the configuration: thus the configuration deter-
mines the possible behaviour of the machine. In some of the config-
urations in which the scanned square is blank (i.e. bears no symbol)
the machine writes down a new symbol on the scanned square: in
other configurations it erases the scanned symbol. The machine may
also change the square which is being scanned, but only by shifting
it one place to right or left. In addition to any of these operations the
m-configuration may be changed. Some of the symbols written down
will form the sequence of figures which is the decimal of the real
number which is being computed. The others are just rough notes to
“assist the memory”. It will only be these rough notes which will be
liable to erasure.[11]
In a side remark in the same paper, Turing briefly introduced an alternative ma-
chine called a choice machine, contrasted with the usual Turing machine that Tur-
ing called an a-machine:
If at each stage the motion of a machine . . . is completely determined
by the configuration, we shall call the machine an “automatic ma-
chine” (or a-machine). For some purposes we might use machines
(choice machines or c-machines) whose motion is only partially de-
termined by the configuration . . . . When such a machine reaches one
of these ambiguous configurations, it cannot go on until some arbi-
trary choice has been made by an external operator. This would be
the case if we were using machines to deal with axiomatic systems
[11].
One of the two ingredients in our model of a symbol-handling agent is a Choice
Machine modified so that it can take part in a communications network by trans-
mitting symbols to other such machines and, under certain conditions of ”logical
synchronization,” can receive symbols transmitted to it by other machines. To as-
sure the unpredictability of a symbol-handling agent, we posit that an “external
operator” chooses a symbol and writes it onto the scanned square of the agent’s
Choice Machine privately, in the sense that the symbol remains unknown to other
agents unless and until the symbol-handling agent that receives the chosen symbol
reports it to others.
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3.1. The motion of symbol-handling agents.
Sequences of symbols on the squares of a tape at a moment are static—they
show no motion. To deal with the physics of motion, one needs to deal not just
with recorded sequences but also with temporal sequences, such as sheep herded
one after another through a gate or the back-and-forth swings of a pendulum.
To express motion mathematically, one faces the hurdle that what a mathe-
matical function does is to assign an element of a codomain to each element of
a domain, with both the domain and the codomain thought of as static. From
the standpoint of physics, motion expressed mathematically is essentially motion
captured in the frames of a movie film detached from information about scale and
speed. The movie film would be the same if the scene filmed were sped up by a
factor and the clock that drives the movie camera were sped up by the same fac-
tor, so that in mathematics one cannot express motion per se. In preparation for
discussing the regulation of the motion of agents necessary to their exchange of
symbols, we flag two points:
1. In the mathematics of the Choice Machine, a ‘move’ is a mapping of a
machine configuration at one moment to a machine configuration at the next
moment, and a sequence of moments is like a sequence of frames of a movie
film, which, by itself, contains no specification of its physical motion, for
example, how rapidly it is to be moved.
2. Implicit in the interpretation of the Choice Machine as representing the
physical action of computation is the subdivision of the moment into a phase
in which the machine can read the scanned square, so that its next action is
determined, and a distinct other phase in which the machine can write on
the square. This subdivision is necessary to avoid a conflict between trying
to read and trying to write on the same square at once.
With these points in mind, we think of a Choice Machine moved by the ticks
of a clock at a rate adjustable (relative to the clock’s own unadjusted internal
standard) by commands from the Turing machine itself, as discussed in [4, 5].
If we picture the clock as having a single hand that cycles around a dial, then
subdivisions of the dial correspond to phases of the computational cycle of the
Turing machine, with a phase in which a symbol can be written on the scanned
square. This modified Choice Machine expresses a computer that can take part in
a communications network, and as such combines both the logic and the motion
required of a process-control computer in contact with an unpredictable environ-
ment. The modified Choice Machine stepped by its adjustable ticks models our
symbol-handling agent.
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3.2. Logical synchronization.
We call the condition in which symbols arrive during a phase of the compu-
tational cycle in which they can be written into memory logical synchronization.
The need for logical synchronization, long known to engineers of digital commu-
nications [12, 13], is reminiscent of a game of catch, in which a player cycles
through phases of throwing and catching a ball, or perhaps more simply a spoken
dialog in which each person alternates between listening and speaking. The re-
quirement for logical synchronization constrains number-carrying networks. (If a
spacetime manifold in invoked, logical synchronization put “stripes” on spacetime
[5].)
Another image of logically synchronized symbol-handling is a bucket brigade,
in which people work in a line, each passing a full bucket to the person to the right
while receiving an empty bucket in exchange, which is next passed to the person
to the left. The people in a bucket brigade work in dovetailing cycles. Each cycle
contains a phase in which one person passes a full bucket to a neighboring person,
sharing a rhythm: if you are to my right, then when you turn to the left, I turn to
the right to pass my full bucket to you and to receive your empty bucket. If I try to
pass you my full bucket outside of the phase in which you can receive it, we spill
the bucket.
Logical synchronization requires more or less continual adjustment of clock
rates to limit the drift of physical clocks. Unavoidable drift in clock rates stems
from quantum uncertainty, from relative motion of the agents, and from other
causes [5]. The adjustment of tick rates of agents’ clocks entails feedback that
responds to the phases at which transmitted symbols arrive. On the blackboard,
we represent the cycle of the agent’s clock by a unit interval of the readings of its
adjustable clock, and we express a reading of a the clock asm.φm where an integer
m indicates a count of cycles and φm is the phase within the cycle. Choosing the
convention that −1/2 < φm ≤ 1/2, we model the phase of writing at which an
agent can receive a character as corresponding to
|φ| < (1− η)/2, (2)
where η (with 0 < η < 1) is a phase interval that makes room for reading. When
this phase constraint is met for a channel between a transmitting agent and a re-
ceiving agent, we say the receiving agent is logically synchronized to the trans-
mitting agent.
The adjustment of the rate of an agent’s clock in order to maintain logical
synchronization with another agent proceeds as a balancing operation. We think
14
of an agent’s clock as having a “faster-slower lever.” The “faster-slower lever”
works like the pointer of a balance instrument that moves one way or the other
in response to opposing impulses from an arriving symbol and from the agent’s
reference signal in the middle of the receptive phase. If the symbol arrives in
the middle of the receptive phase, neither well before nor well after the refer-
ence signal, the response of the balance is indeterminate; it can tip a little either
way or hover in the middle. While symbol recognition is invariant under limited
variations in timing, making it also invariant under interchange of manufactured
instruments, the balancing that drives rate adjustment will not be the same if the
balancing instrument is interchanged with another of the same manufacture. We
speak of the behavior of measured phases that vary when two balancing compo-
nents of the same design are interchanged as idiosyncratic.
Logical synchronization depends on the happy fact that the idiosyncrasy en-
demic to balancing does not matter, because it occurs only when the symbol ar-
rives more or less in the middle of the receptive phase, so that a small adjustment
of clock rate cannot cause the next few symbols to arrive outside their receptive
phases. If the agent’s clock with its ambiguous small adjustments drifts enough so
that the subsequent arrivals are noticeably early or late relative to the mid-phase
aiming point, the operation of the balance becomes definite and adequately cor-
rective.
Remark: Maintaining logical synchronization depends on prompt
steering in response to deviations that can be expressed numerically
only later, after they have been responded to. Furthermore, the nu-
merical expression of the deviations is necessarily idiosyncratic in
that neither two persons nor two machines can be expected to pro-
duce numerical records of phases that agree.
To represent the transmission of numerals from one agent to another on the
blackboard, we follow Shannon in speaking of a communications channel; how-
ever we augment his information-theoretic concept of a channel [14] with the
agent’s clock readings at the transmission and reception of symbol-bearing sig-
nals [5]. We indicate the timing in a channel from agent A to agent B, by a set of
pairs, each pair of the form (m.φm, n.φn). The first memberm.φm is an A-reading
at which agent A transmits a signal and the second member n.φn is a B-reading
at which agent B registers the reception of the signal. In this way the notion of
a channel is expanded to include the clock readings that indicate phases of signal
arrivals that have to be controlled in order for the logical synchronization of the
channel to be maintained.
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Proposition: A symbol can propagate from one agent to another only
if the symbol arrives within the writing phase of the receiving agent.
Corollary: Exact agreement concerning symbols depends on idiosyn-
cratic management of phases.
4. Sequencing failures and the concept of objectivity
What happens when a symbol-carrying signal arrives at a receiving agent just
too late for the agent’s writing phase? Forty years ago we investigated this ques-
tion experimentally by examining the behavior of an elemental decision agent, a
clocked flip-flop. Packed by the million on the silicon chips of communicating
computers, the clocked flip-flop is a memory device into which a 0 or 1 can be
written, provided that the symbol arrives during a phase in which the clock opens
a gate. A flip-flop is the electronic analog of a hinge that records a 1 if flipped
one way or a 0 if flopped the other way. In the case of an electronic flip-flop, an
arriving 1 comes embodied as an electrical pulse of energy above a high thresh-
old, and an arriving 0 comes with an energy below a low threshold, well under
the high threshold. For a flip-flop set at 0, a 1 arriving while the gate opens on
a phase of writing can flip the hinge over to record a 1. In effect, the clocked
flip-flop is aware of the possible symbols that it might receive, in that it balances
any arriving signal against a reference energy level. If the pulse energy is above
the reference level, the flip-flop both augments the pulse energy to lift it above the
high threshold and flips the hinge over. If the pulse energy is below the reference
level, the flip-flop drains its energy below the lower threshold and stays flopped
back to indicate a 0.
A symbol arriving after the clock closes the gate is shut out and ignored by
the flip-flop; however, if a pulse of electrical energy conveying a 1 arrives just
as the writing phase is ending, in a race with the clock’s closing of the gate, the
pulse squeaks through the closing gate into the receiving flip-flop as a “runt pulse.”
Then the hinge might flip to a 1 or might stay at 0, but there is another possibility—
indeed a possibility outside the frame in which digital signals are conventionally
discussed: the runt pulse can be so close to the reference level that it lifts the
hinge part way but not all the way over, leaving the hinge hung up in an unstable
“in between” state, teetering on edge, until, eventually, it flips or flops [15, 16, 17].
This “in between” state occurs occasionally when a computer responds to un-
synchronized input signals, and it leads to logical confusion, as follows. Compu-
tations require that a receiving clocked flip-flop A transmit copies of its record not
just to one following flip-flop but through a fan-out to a pair of flip-flops, say B
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and C, so that whatever symbol was in A at an earlier moment appears in both B
and C at the next moment; that is, B and C both receive 0 or both receive 1. But if
flip-flopA teeters in an unstable equilibrium, then flip-flopsB andC may not only
hang up, but can “fall differently” so that the symbol in B, instead of matching
that in C, conflicts with it, which is what we mean by “logical confusion.”
We explored the teetering of a flip-flop not just analytically on the blackboard,
but as it takes place physically on an electronics bench. The results, reported
in [8], were clear enough, but we could not describe what was to us the most
interesting aspects of the experiment; words failed. With our subsequent proof
that puts unpredictability squarely within physics, however, we can now tell the
story. In particular, the experimental design to be described illustrates how the
investigators and the laboratory bench shape each other, how the investigators
must be aware of the need to adjust the devices on the bench, how the devices must
be designed to be receptive to adjustment by the investigator, how unpredictable
outcomes propagate from the bench to the investigator, and how the unpredictable
responses of the investigator to these outcomes propagate back to the bench.
Our experiment to measure the teetering of a clocked flip-flop consisted of
several billion trials of sending a 1-pulse to a clocked flip flop A that, after an ad-
justable delay T , was read by two flip-flops B and C. It took about 300 nanosec-
onds per trial. For each trial we arranged for the 1-pulse to race a gate-closing
clock pulse, causing a runt pulse that made the flip-flop A teeter on edge. To tell
if A was teetering on edge, we arranged the electronics to keep a running average
over past trials to record how often the flip-flop, after teetering, fell to 1 vs. how
often it fell to zero. If the running average was about even between 1’s to 0’s, then
the timing of the of the 1-pulse relative to the clock pulse was likely to make the
flip-flop teeter.
But when we first tried to set the timing so as to bring about this desired even
running average, we ran into trouble. We generated both the clock pulse and the
1-pulse repetitively at 300 ns intervals through a delay line from a common signal
generator, and we regulated the timing of the 1-pulse relative to the clock pulse by
adjusting the delay of the delay line for the 1-pulse. The trouble was that however
we adjusted the delay line, we got either all 1’s or all 0’s from the running average.
Because of drift in the delay line and perhaps other unanalyzed effects, we could
not get the very delicate balancing of the “hinge” that we wanted. The solution
was to use feedback. We electronically read the running average and fed that back
to automatically adjust the delay line. Feedback worked like a charm to put the
flip-flop on edge well enough to run the experiment.
Another interesting feature of the experimental design was the detection of
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teetering. Prior investigations of teetering in flip-flops made use of oscilloscopes
that operated on faster time scales than that of the flip-flop; in effect the oscil-
loscope acts as a movie camera to photograph the teetering of the (electronic)
hinge. Instead of using an external high-speed “camera”, we wanted an experi-
mental design that works even if the flip-flop operates faster than any such external
“camera.” To this end, instead of an oscilloscope, we used the logical confusion
ensuing from a runt pulse as a means of measurement, by using the pair of flip-
flops B and C, as described above. We could then plot the statistics of how often
B and C disagreed with each other as a function of the waiting time T , as reported
in [8].
Feedback, though it worked like a charm, posed what then seemed to us to
be a conundrum. We were used to thinking of an experiment as something that
an investigator may start, but must then keep his or her hands off until a result
emerges. With feedback, we put ourselves, or at least the automated feedback
loop that acted for us, right into the operation of each trial, so that we were using
outcomes from earlier trials to direct a current trial. Now we say: we as inves-
tigators act like symbol-handling agents, and that’s what symbol-handling agents
do. But still, the acceptance of feedback invites one to rethink the conventional
devotion to “objectivity” as a Cartesian preclusion of the observer from tinkering
with the observed. By admitting feedback from previous trials, one can explore
unstable physical behavior not otherwise susceptible to investigation.
In connection with “objectivity” there is something interesting about the use
the pair of receiving flip-flops B and C to detect teetering. When flip-flop A is re-
ceiving a 1-symbol under conditions of logical synchronization, so the 1-symbol
arrives well within the phase of writing, there is no disagreement between B and
C. The flip-flops B and C act as agents that are interchangeable. Such inter-
changeability is a hallmark of what we view as a reconceived “objectivity”: over
a sequence of trials in which A is sent at one moment sometimes a 0 and some-
times a 1, at the following moment B and C reliably show the same outcome:
both show 0 or both show 1. The discrepancies registered in the experiment show
that the measurement of a phase φ cannot be objective in the way we mean it: two
detecting agents can disagree; indeed we used what might be called the idiosyn-
crasy of the agents B and C to indicate the phase corresponding to the closing
of the gate. As we said in the previous section, measurements of phase, neces-
sarily idiosyncratic, are indispensable to the logical synchronization that enables
interchangeable agents to agree about counts of cycles and sequences of symbols
received.
In summary, by introducing a distinction between symbols registered inter-
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changeably by several agents and the idiosyncratic phases that must be responded
to in order to maintain logical synchronization, the investigation of a race between
a symbol and a clock tick exhibits a crack in the Cartesian veneer of disembodied
objectivity in which theoretical physics pretends to wrap we who investigate:
1. The race condition could not be passively observed but had to be actively
maintained in the face of disruptive effects that we could not predict.
2. Maintenance of the race condition depends on the investigator choosing a
control algorithm that specifies how a feedback loop responds to unpre-
dicted effects, a choice that requires an act of imagination.
3. The most sensitive indicator of a race condition is a “measurable breakdown
in Cartesian objectivity”: two detectors disagree.
5. Unpredictable, symbol-handling agents in physics
5.1. Physicists communicate with each other and with their experimental devices.
Physics depends on the transmission of symbols, such as the sequences of
symbols that make numerical records, both records of experimental results and
records of calculations. Yet until now theoretical physics, with its emphasis on
particles and fields, has had no place in its vocabulary for record or symbol. The
absence of symbol from the vocabulary was perhaps appropriate under the out-
of-date picture of an experiment as producing a stream of records in which no
record depends on the records produced earlier. But today’s experiments involve
computer-mediated feedback, in which symbols conveying theoretical calcula-
tions and symbols conveying experimental results combine to update calculations
and to steer the experiment. The physical behaviors possible as targets of inves-
tigation depend on the possibilities for the transmission of symbols, so that it no
longer makes sense to leave symbol and record out of the vocabulary of theoretical
physics.
With regard to the application of theory to physical situations, one thinks more
clearly by picturing numeric symbols expressing both calculations and measured
outcomes as resident in agents’ memories, e.g. as on their tapes. Thus we see the
symbols of (1) as written “on tape”, in sharp distinction to any physical evidence.
From Sec. 2 it follows that the symbols of an explanation can never by uniquely
determined by evidence, so that a written explanation depends on a logically un-
predictable choice of a theorist.
Once one sees explanatory statements this way, one is free to straddle differ-
ent theoretical frameworks (rationalizing what is done anyway): parts of any big
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experiment, such as those conducted at the Large Hadron Collider, are described
in essentially Newtonian terms, while other parts are described in the language of
quantum theory. One is free to think in whatever mode one chooses for one or
another part or aspect of an explanation. For example, in [8], we offer a quantum-
theoretic explanation, indeed two of them, for the flip-flop, a device that is also
conveniently explained in terms of classical circuit theory.
5.2. Regulation and measurement of motion.
Traditional physics presupposes coordinate systems as mathematical construc-
tions that one relates to physical systems. Coordinate systems are defined (at
least locally) by Einstein’s imagined patterns of light signals propagating between
imagined proper clocks. In terms of proper clocks and signals, Einstein defined
the synchronization of proper clocks fixed to a non-rotating, rigid body in free fall
(i.e., a Lorentz frame), and he co-defined “time” as the readings of such proper
clocks, with the implication that distance from proper clock A to proper clock B
is defined, as in radar, in terms of the duration at A from the transmission of a
light signal to the return of its echo from B. Specifically, according to Einstein’s
definition of the synchronization of proper clocks [18], clock B is synchronous to
clock A if at any A-reading tA, A could send a signal reaching B at B-reading tB ,
such that an echo from B would reach A at A-reading t′
A
, satisfying the criterion
tB =
1
2
(tA + t
′
A
). (3)
Unlike logical synchronization with its explicit dependence on idiosyncratic
responses to phases, Einstein’s synchronization criteria are blackboard criteria
that take no account of the responses to phases necessary to the communication of
symbols. To implement a coordinate frame, actual signals conveying numerals as
symbols are necessary. In [4, 5] we tell how, in a generic curved spacetime, there
is no dense set of clocks that can pairwise satisfy Einstein’s synchronization crite-
rion, but a finite network of symbol-handling agents can act as a reference frame;
furthermore, such a network can serve as a detector of gravitational radiation. In
[4] we also note that clocks on a rotating platform (such as a merry-go-round) can
never satisfy Einstein’s synchronization criteria but still can be logically synchro-
nized.
In practice, computerized signal-handling agents take part in the generation
of Universal Coordinated Time (UTC), as well as in the operation of the Global
Positioning System (GPS). As noted above, to generate time broadcasts, NIST
must adjust the rates at which its clocks tick in relation to one another. This
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adjustment depends on the communication of numeric symbols in a system of
feedback loops [5].
Besides noticing that time broadcasts depend on networks of agents that re-
spond to unpredictable deviations, we call attention to the freedom of investiga-
tors to “build their own time”, tailored to their particular investigations. This is
routine in experiments investigating the instability of cutting-edge optical clocks:
one achieves much higher precision by comparing one clock directly against an-
other; the idea of comparing each to NIST time makes no sense, for the best
optical clocks have much smaller instabilities than does NIST time. Similar direct
comparison that bypass “time broadcasts” are required for LIGO.
5.3. Occurrences of outcomes used promptly in feedback.
Quantum-theoretic models predict probabilities of outcomes but the occur-
rence or non-occurrence of an outcome at a particular trial of a generic measure-
ment is, by postulate, unpredictable. In experiments without feedback, the occur-
rences of outcomes over a run of trials are tallied up but not otherwise acted on,
a fact that can obscure the significance of the unpredictability of occurrences of
outcomes. With feedback in which an agent responds promptly to one or a few
occurrences of outcomes to bring about physical behavior not otherwise attain-
able, as discussed above, one sees essential unpredictability at work, not just in
the mind of the physicist, but also on the workbench of experiments, for example
in a photo-detector that may or may not respond to light at the single-photon level.
5.4. Changes in principle brought by the recognition of symbol-handling agents.
Timing controlled by feedback stands in contrast to “time” as a concept in
physics, whether the “time” is that of Newton or that of Einstein, for both concepts
of “time,” stand outside of the whatever is under investigation. As Newton put it:
Absolute, true, and mathematical time, in and of itself and of its own
nature, without reference to anything external, flows uniformly and
by another name is called duration. Relative, apparent, and common
time is any sensible and external measure (exact or nonuniform) of
duration by means of motion; such a measure—for example, an hour,
a day, a month, a year—is commonly used instead of true time [19].
While Newton says that “true time” does not refer to anything external, this is a
fudge, because he postulates “true time” as externally provided, independent of
what any person or other entity of interest does. Two centuries after Newton, Ein-
stein made time relative to the concept of a proper clock, but the proper clock is
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imagined to tick at a rate that is again externally provided. And neither in New-
tonian physics nor in special or general relativity is the distinction drawn between
evidence on the laboratory bench and the formulas written on a blackboard, mak-
ing it a challenge to think in terms of this distinction; yet the distinction between
evidence and its explanations must be made in coming to grips with the role of
symbols in physics.
5.4.1. Experimental freedom to set aside the assumption of spacetime.
The assumption of a spacetime manifold as an explanatory principle has had
a dominant place in physics for decades; these days, however, from a number of
sources, one would like to be able to set aside that assumption. An issue is that
the assumption of a spacetime manifold is built into the reference system which
the International Astronomical Union (IAU) offers for the location of events, such
as the event of the tick of an agent’s clock [20]. Although for many purposes con-
venient, the assumption of a spacetime manifold in an unnecessary impediment to
exploration. As shown in [4], the records of a network of agents of clock readings
at the transmission and the reception of signals form a basis, free of any assump-
tion of a manifold, against which to experimentally test hypotheses of spacetime
manifolds.
5.4.2. Limitations on the interleaving of sequences.
Consider the case of a three-way race among signals X , Y , and Z arriving at
a place at which they are to be temporally ordered. Such a comparison involves
pairwise balancing, involving flip-flops or their equivalent as decision elements.
Each of the three signals fans out to allow three separate pairwise comparisons
of which came before which. In a close race, teetering in all three pairwise com-
parisons can result in finding: X before Y , Y before Z, and Z before X , rather
than the “expected” X before Z, violating the transitivity of an ordering relation,
and suggesting a limit on the validity of even local temporal ordering. Making
sense out of temporal order requires distinguishing the question of which cycle a
symbol recognition occurred from the question of the phase of a cycle at which a
signal arrived [21].
5.4.3. Irreversibility of unpredictable events.
The basic equations of physics involve a time variable t and are invariant un-
der the transformation t→ −t. When the mathematical language of experimental
physics is over-stressed, this invariance appears to impose time reversibility as
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a principle of physics, in conflict with thermodynamics. But, as we have em-
phasized, equations written on the blackboard are not the whole story in physics.
Both because of their unpredictable choices and their action in feedback loops that
respond to unpredictable occurrences of outcomes, symbol-handling agents intro-
duce a heretofore overlooked source of irreversibility into physics, even when the
equations they write on the blackboard are invariant under t→ −t. As we explain
in [22], widening the scope of descriptions admissible to physics to include the
agents and the symbols that link theory to experiments opens up a new source of
time-irreversibility in physics.
5.5. Networks of symbol-handling agents as metaphors.
And beyond the role of symbols in time broadcasts and in investigations con-
ducted by physicists, symbols carry information in networks other than those used
by people, including networks in active matter in the living world, for example, as
codes written in the nucleobases of strands of DNA molecules, or the sequences
of amino-acid side chains of a protein molecule.
6. Discussion
The first root of the recognition of symbol-handling agents came from the
proof that sharpened the separation between evidence and its explanations. Our
awareness of this separation comes and goes; this awareness is a limited resource,
hardly to be maintained in the midst of calculations, so one can have no “once-
and-for-all” separation; however; we can and do find occasions to separate our
thinking at the blackboard from our thoughts about the bench to which we apply
the blackboard, and sometimes this turns out to be very productive. An example
to do with cryptography is mentioned at the end of [5]. When we recognize that
our connecting of an explanation to evidence takes an act of our own guesswork,
we recognize our own agency in the physical world.
The recognition of our own agency, our own participation in guesswork, in-
fluenced by our own individuality, opposes a long history of efforts to claim for
physics an “objectivity” that goes back to the scientific outlook of Descartes. As
Riskin summarizes Descartes’s stance:
Seeing the world as pure machine, lifting his thinking soul out of the
world, even out of its own bodily interface with the world, Descartes
accomplished the distancing of self from world that defines modern
subjectivity, the sense of a fully autonomous, inner selfhood, and
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modern objectivity, the sense of regarding the world from a neutral
position outside of it [23].
In Sec. 2 we reviewed the separation of the blackboard of theory from evidence
on the work bench, leading to the necessity of a guess beyond the reach of logic
to bridge that separation. It is a guess that selects an explanation of evidence,
or even that narrows the selection to any finite number of explanations. Because
explanations enter both the design and the operation of experiments that generate
evidence, the unavoidable guess makes a place in physics for the personal acts of
imagination of physicists.
The proven dependence of physics on guesses as acts of imagination refutes
any claim of a quantum explanation to an “objectivity” that aspires to produce a
“final truth” from a neutral position outside the world investigated. As an inves-
tigator, I work with guessed assumptions, some of which I change from time to
time. I climb about about on a “tree of assumptions,” able, perhaps, to let go of
this or that assumption, but only by taking hold of other assumptions [8]; there
is no way for me (or for you) to look at the tree of assumptions from outside it.
Thus “objectivity” as a neutral position outside the world investigated makes no
sense even as a goal, but a different, less global, notion of objectivity survives,
in that, under appropriate circumstances, logical communication that two agents
can agree about remains possible. By way of illustration, after the experiments on
the reception of signals discussed in Sec. 4, we did some experiments on people
counting. As written in notes of JMM:
In 1982, I asked my son Sam and his friend Gordon to act as agents in
some experiments on counting. I put a few paper cups on an otherwise
bare table and asked them to each write down on a slip of paper the
number of cups. In one trial they looked at the table together, in
another trial they entered the room one after another; in both cases,
unsurprisingly, they counted the same number of cups. Then we did
another series of trials in which the two boys viewed the same table at
the same time, as told by a second hand on wall clock that they could
both see. At each trial I first cleared the table and then gave the boys
a starting signal some seconds before the second hand crossed the
twelve o’clock mark. While they watched the table I would put paper
cups on it, and in some trials I would slide some cups and remove
some while adding others. Their job was to each separately write
down the number of cups on the tables as the clock hand passed 12.
While they would get the same number if the cups were not in motion,
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when I fiddled with the cups while they counted them, they usually
wrote down counts that were in disagreement, e.g one wrote down
“8” while the other wrote down “11.”
From that experiment come two interesting results. One was bringing down to the
work bench, in this case the table, the notion of an objective number as a number
reported by interchangeable agents, and so independent of which boy reported it.
The other was the distinction between the situation in which change was blocked
while a count was made—in effect logical synchronization—and the situation
which, as in the experiments on logical confusion, the moving and the viewing
were unsynchronized, leading to disagreement. We find then that objective counts
are indeed possible but only under circumstances of logical synchronization.
While we forbear to try to explain the empirical propensity of agents at all
levels from cells to civilizations to form and operate networks of logically syn-
chronized symbolic communication, we point to this propensity as an overlooked
cosmic order, ripe for further investigation.
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